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Abstract 
 
Recent 21st century political developments in South Africa have given rise to debate surrounding a 
threat to a functioning democracy. New radical political parties, turmoil in the labour sectors, and 
dysfunctional government policies and activities have made populist tendencies a central aspect of this 
debate. Populism is an entity oft evoked in a negative light and rhetoric in this debate. It is associated 
with demagogues and the ‘uncontrollable’ urges of the masses that would be let loose upon society 
given the chance, destroying democracy in the process. It is the aim of this paper to argue the opposite. 
By expanding and contributing to the theoretical literature on populism, and through the analysis of 
empirical evidence – the Western Cape farm worker’s strikes and the Marikana strikes and subsequent 
massacre of 2012 –in South Africa this research report seeks to fill a gap in the conceptualisation and 
practical characterisation of populism in our political setting. Can populism be conceptually, 
theoretically, and empirically utilised to characterise and explain trends in contemporary South African 
politics and can it be utilised in providing a contextual underpinning for explaining recent events in 
South African society as a whole? Through the reliance on the theories of Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek 
the aim will be to identify the underlying gaps in democratic politics that gives rise to populist 
movements and through this argument to build and utilise this conception of populism as a positive and 
effective analytical tool of contemporary South African politics.    
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
2012 arguably represents the most turbulent year in post-Apartheid South African labour history, while 
being the “most protest filled year in the political past of the “New” South Africa.1 The latter months of 
that year exposed to South Africa, and the world, the underlying and (at face value) “hidden” 
antagonisms fostered and maintained by the systemic legacies of Apartheid. In August of 2012 unofficial 
strikes erupted at the Lonmin mine in Marikana amongst a backdrop of union clashes, intimidation, and 
violence between the National Union of Metal Workers (NUMSA) and the Association of Mine Workers 
and Construction Union (AMCU) and a long history of dissatisfaction with competitively low wages, poor 
housing conditions, and brutal working conditions. The strikes were met with union (NUMSA) 
intimidation, mass firing of workers by mine bosses, and a violent crackdown of the strikes by the police 
in the form of the Marikana Massacre. Seventeen days later on the other side of the country, in the 
farming town of De Doorns in the Western Cape, female farm workers initiated a wildcat strike that 
echoed Marikana as they demanded better pay, an end to abuse by farm owners, better housing 
conditions for seasonal workers, and an end to police intimidation. Three years later and the legacies of 
these strikes still remain fresh in the minds of South Africans. The cause, issues, and results of these 
strikes have remained largely unresolved and protests and strikes have continued throughout this time.  
 
Until this “rupture of reality” in 2012, South African politics since 1994 has been popularly portrayed in 
our collective imaginations as a democratic success, a political compromise that prevented civil war and 
ushered in a period of reconciliation and non-racialism in this country’s history. But in reality while the 
latter two aspects of society progressed in the publican lexicon, the former has just as thoroughly been 
let down in the public imagination, and after 20 years of a new South Africa the African National 
Congress is still the governing party of South Africa, its internal politics (with its contradictions) very 
much shaping the national policy agenda and the larger political landscape. Since the turning of the 
millennium South Africans have had to come to a realisation that the change which was so brightly 
envisioned in the past would not come overnight and that the democratic process would not magically 
                                                          
1
 http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/10/18/south-african-massacre-was-the-tip-of-an-iceberg/  
- 9 - 
 
construct itself as a mature one. In short, South Africa has seen since 1994 experienced – what has been 
slowly realised in the global imagination of civil society – that deservingly or not, the hopeful and 
enthusiastic politics of the past, the politics which always appeared as rested on a solid ideological 
foundation seems to have evaporated. 
 
We have played witness to increasing dissatisfaction by the working class and poverty stricken masses 
towards the economic and social values espoused by government. These antagonisms have been 
punctuated by ever increasing violent protests, historic strikes, and the formulation of a new political 
party which seeks to represent itself as a hero of the people through placing itself as a vanguard in the 
struggle and proclaiming its leader as “commander in chief”2.  Towards the end of 2014 the South 
African business magazine, The Economist published an article entitled ‘Up the Creek’ in which the 
author highlighted and warned against a curious “danger” within the political spirit of the African 
National Congress (ANC): stating simply that “President Jacob Zuma’s government is drifting between 
liberalism and populism”3. This reference to populism in juxtaposition to liberalism has become an 
increasingly common phenomenon within the media and popular consensus in recent years. 
 
The nature of South African society since 1994 reinforces this constant barrage of criticism of politics – 
income inequality persists, poverty remains high, education is faltering and 1 Flinders, M. ‘In Defence of 
Politics: Fifty Years On’, pg. 640 4 industry is becoming more technologically advanced without an 
increasing skill intensive labour pool, service deliveries continue to not be met, unions clash with each 
other and conduct running battles in city centres, xenophobic attacks are not uncommon and have 
erupted into riots in the past, community justice is often not prevented, the police and private security 
companies are shown to hold contempt for the law and the rights of citizens (a la Mido Macia), 
corruption by is rife, the judicial system is being inundated with ruling party-affiliated cronies, – and on 
the anniversary a year since the Marikana massacres of mine workers by the coercive institution of the 
state in defence of capital South Africa sits on a precipice of a faltering faith in the democratic process 
and ideals of the post-Apartheid nation. In short the historical circumstance for a populist movement 
                                                          
2
 http://effighters.org.za/structure/officials/  
3
 ‘Up the Creek’ in The Economist, 2
nd
 August, 2014 
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has existed for some time, and seems all the more relevant at this current stage of contemporary social 
development and politics.  
 
The Problem 
The key problem that this research report deals with is that of populism. The research seeks to identify 
the nature of populism and its manifestation in South Africa. The concern is to explore whether the 
rampant popular protests, strikes, civil disobedience of the last few years, are a manifestation of a new 
form of popular democracy, and what this might mean for our understanding and conceptualisation of 
democracy. We perceive of democracy in the public realm as maintaining or holding certain problems 
which are open to various interpretations and that allow for popular “eruptions” – that have been 
interpreted as a ‘populist’ attack on democracy itself. They are thus seen as blockages to the democratic 
process, rather than as popular manifestations of democracy. Namely these “deficiencies” fall within the 
frame of insufficient democratic institutional development that allows for individuals to pursue abuses 
of the system, either through corruption or consolidation of power. Democracy within this frame and 
popular narrative is therefore something that ought to always be expanded, consolidated, and 
protected lest such abuses continue: in short the individual is always to blame for the limits of the 
system and therefore “responsible” civil servants or “positive” democratic culture are needed to negate 
its openness to abuse. Backlashes, in the form of protests, rampant strikes, and civil disobedience are 
thusly the result of democracy not having been expanded, consolidated, and encouraged enough as well 
as not having matured into this supposed “end-point” of politics as encapsulated in the idea of liberal 
democracy.  
 
The rise of social and political movements, political parties, and the increases in strikes and protests that 
address, as their main concerns, the very same abuses in the public narrative are viewed through the 
above lens as radical and often counter to the ideals of a democratic society. Populism is popularly 
conceptualised as reactionary politics and is intrinsically linked to the people and popular politics: in this 
conceptualisation it is abuse by and for the elites of society that is met with anger and resentment by 
those who are not the elite – i.e. the poor masses – and they act out this frustration in the form of 
strikes, protests, and general violent excess. It is this vehicle of violence (as disruption) that is 
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considered to be “populist” in the minds of the public. This categorisation is part and parcel of the 
theory of ‘twin-totalities’ of democracy: or the idea of the oligarchy versus the people. Labelling of the 
oppositional forces is therefore in broad strokes – as we see more often in the dichotomy of the global 
and local – as populist. We are thus faced with a situation in which such labelling is not only on the rise 
in popular terms but is also slowly but surely being incorporated into serious public discussion and 
academic thought on the political4. This trend is however negatively matched by the association of the 
pejorative nature of the term “populist” in these incorporations into public thought. At worst it is 
haphazardly applied by critics, “experts”, and political opponents to discredit counter movements and at 
best the term is left with a vague meaning. This has resulted in the term being more of a tool of the 
political instead of as an understanding of the political in our contemporary situation.  
 
We thusly see “populism” being labelled as a threat to democracy, private property, race, or capitalism 
itself when it is “identified” with protests and strikes. Similarly, when “identified” with political parties 
and social movements that call for radical change the term is invokes with the label of “threats to 
constitutionalism” while the leaders of these parties and movements are quickly labelled as 
demagogues who do not want true radical change but are rather using “the people” as a means to their 
own ends of power (such as with the EFF at the time of its birth and AMCU in recent years). In essence 
the temptation of referral by the liberal left to fascistic tendencies in association with populist struggles 
of the Western political scene has become modus operandi in the local level in South Africa. In the realm 
of academia progress has been made in breaching and breaking this typological nature of the 
understanding of populism (much of which will be explored in the literature review) but has for the most 
part avoided a reconstitutive understanding and attempts fall largely within the trend explained above 
and faces much internal disagreements whenever discussion arises5. Furthermore, what we can call 
“positive” attempts at a reconstitutive and normative approach is relatively new and often evokes much 
controversy.  
 
The Purpose 
                                                          
4
 Corduwener, P. ‘The Relationship between Populism and Liberal Democracy: Three New Insights’, pg. 3 
5
 Corduwener, P. ‘The Relationship between Populism and Liberal Democracy: Three New Insights’, pg. 3 
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Having explored the “problem” associated with populism the purpose of the research report pertains to 
the following. We are primarily concerned with providing an understanding of populism that is 
theoretically, conceptually, and ultimately practically applicable in contemporary South African politics. 
This will be achieved through the prism of current uncertainties in global and local democratic politics. 
The key issues that we aim to understand are: First how populism will play out in the South African 
political landscape and what this might mean for the future. Secondly we seek to explain the behaviour 
of the “underprivileged classes” and the subsequent reactions by – and attitudes of – the state/or social 
order towards these actions. Tied to this second aim is thirdly to account for and explain the growing 
authoritarianism and constricting (ANC) hegemony of the state as a growing radicalism of the people 
appears; i.e.an emerging populism.  The research report thus works towards this purpose by using the 
theoretical constructs of Laclau’s ideas around hegemony, radical democracy and populism alongside 
Zizek’s notion of antagonism. The research report aims to better articulate the methods in which 
dislocations of subjects in South Africa form as political, social, and economic struggles but also as 
particularities in reaction to ANC hegemonic practices occurs and thereby proposes the possibilities for 
their transformations into struggles in the realm of the universal that can contest the established social 
order. Through this theoretical proposition and analysis, it is hoped, that we can understand (in my 
view) a re-articulation of the Left in contemporary South Africa and the formation of what Mazibuko 
Jara identifies as a ‘call for a new Left’6 in the future South Africa.    
 
The importance of populism as a conceptual entity in the realm of the political is for me underlined by 
an ever increasing understanding of populism as something inherently present in the process of politics 
itself. It is the underlying political logic that Ernesto Laclau identifies in the body communitarian as a 
whole: modern politics (especially democratic politics) and populism are intertwined. This is especially 
relevant, and in my opinion (and the aim of the research to show that it is), the case itself in South 
African politics. Through understanding populism from this perspective I believe that the understanding 
of South African politics can be furthered and improved upon, or at the very least help to explain 
political developments in political conflict, party politics, state institutional development and 
functionality, governmental legitimacy, citizenship, etc. By doing I hope to present an alternative 
conceptualisation of populism that can be both a positive and effective analytical tool of South African 
                                                          
6
 Jara, M. ‘The Call for a New Left’, Amandla! Media.  
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politics in general and in regard to antagonisms from below and their expressions specifically.     
Furthermore I think there is a need to address the issue of the conceptualisation of the nation in relation 
to populism, as although it tends to be characterised as historically dichotomising society between 
exploiting elites and exploited majority, I argue that in the South African case the concept of racialism is 
imperfect in accounting for historical injustice and that non-racialism cannot account for the realities of 
contemporary society (i.e. racial trends in inequality): essentially populism in this regard is a positive 
unifying idea.  
 
 
The Methodology 
As the research report is concerned with an application of a theoretical construct of populism in the 
context of South African politics it uses a methodological approach that is comprised of a synthesis of 
theoretical, conceptual and empirical efforts.  
 
Theoretical Framework and Method 
A theoretical base was constructed from a review of the key literature on the concept of populism 
within western political theory. Populism was reconceptualised following this literature review that 
defines the characteristics of populism along Laclauian and Zizekian lines in the South African context 
and conceptually tests this theory in relation to the evidence and arguments of primary and secondary 
sources and its application in qualitative research of two specific case studies (mentioned below). 
Framing the conceptualisation of populism in South Africa required the study of the political landscape 
and its evolutionary trajectory in recent years. In order to do this the research looked at (where 
available in archives) party policy documents, party conference meeting minutes, and political 
statements to the press/media by key figures and spokespersons as an underpinning of shifting tides 
within the South African political landscape. In addition a critical review of the key South African 
literature on this topic was conducted which looked at academic, media, and expert writings in a dual-
layered strategy of bringing the theory of populism ‘home’ as well as exploring critical reception and 
ideological narratives in the study. 
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Empirical Framework and Method 
This was achieved by focusing on two case studies chosen from a wide array of recent social, economic, 
and political unrest in South Africa, specifically in the study of the Western Cape farm worker’s strikes 
(2012 – 2013) and the Marikana crisis (2012). The cases were explored and analysed through the use 
primarily of sources that sought to explain the cause and complexities of each event. In conjunction with 
this the research gathered empirical data through the use of qualitative research methods – data 
collected in the field in the form of select interviews with key figures involved in these events and 
experts who reported and performed research on these cases. 
 
Shortcoming/Restrictions and Gaps 
While the research report attempts to make the case for extant South African populism and its 
characteristics as thoroughly as possible, the limitations of this study pertain to the scope of a singular 
analysis within a limited time frame as well as the limitations that a Master’s research report imposes. A 
much larger research project would be required to be undertaken. This study is thus exploratory and 
comprises the delineation of a field of thought on the nature of South African populism. It hopes to 
provide a helpful theoretical construct for further research and analysis. Its limited scope means that it 
can but simply uncover the beginnings of an understanding of the complexities involved in such an 
attempt.  This also takes into account that the theoretical framework/identity of populism the research 
report uses is not inherently conclusive as the topic is a fundamentally (relatively) new addition in 
critical political theory and is highly debated in the literature. Furthermore, and much more crucially, 
there is an ever-present danger inherent in the systematic analysis of hegemonic and universal struggles 
in this case:  not to fall into the trap of providing ‘formal co-ordinates of every ideologico-political 
protest’ while similarly not merely ‘elaborating the notional structure of today’s (postmodern) specific 
political practice which is emerging after the retreat of the classical Left.7’ 
 
                                                          
7
 Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, pg. 106 
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In respect of the empirical research is the limited way in which cases can be explored in this research 
report. The reliance on two regional case studies – while their issues are linked in many respects and 
signify endemic problems in the broader field of South African politics – limits the report to case specific 
applications of theory. Thus the case for the theory is based on limited evidence and itself carries the 
problem of assumed knowledge.  
 
The Structure 
The research report addresses the above mentioned purpose in the following manner: 
 
We initiate the aims of the research report by framing the general arguments about populism, and 
present a review of the manifold ways in which populism is understood. An attempt to explain the 
slippery nature of the term will be made. 
 
Secondly we will focus on the topic of populism by examining the influential work of Benjamin Arditi, 
Jacques Ranciere, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek who have written extensively on the issues 
surrounding this subject in recent years. By analysing these works the research report will attempt a 
synthesis of these theories into a functioning theoretical framework for the complex topic of populism 
on which we can expand. It is hoped that this synthesis will enable new theoretical insights to emerge 
through the empirical evidence we will present.  
 
We will then, through secondary and primary sources, examine the two case studies we have selected 
from South Africa: namely, the Western Cape farm worker strikes of late 2012 and early 2013, and the 
issues and consequences of the Marikana labour strikes of late 2012. Through these case studies we will 
feed in the theoretical “hook” we established in the literature review, testing it against the evidence 
presented in the cases and thereby attempt to establish sufficient grounds for our conclusions. 
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Once having done this we will conclude the research report by briefly re-tracing our steps (covering the 
main arguments we have put forward) and providing a synthesis to the analysis of the the main research 
problem. 
 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
The literature surrounding the “question” of populism, its characteristics, definitions and incarnations 
within democratic societies is as diverse in its approach to the aforementioned facets as is the debate 
surrounding its impact in society and politics in general. Much has been written on the topic, from the 
characterisations of populism as an extra-democratic negative iteration of popular political action by the 
undercurrents of society swept up by demagogues seeking authoritarian power8, to the argument of 
populism as an integral part of democracy (and the political itself), a logic of political action which 
compliments democracy and reinforces the process of popular party/public politics.9 Whereas populism 
is popularly thought of in the former category it is of more use to explore the latter in relation to the 
political possibilities that could arise out of such political action/logic (by those such as Laclau and 
Mouffe). The literature review will first identify the contexts of the seemingly vague ideas associated 
with populism, it will then move on to explore the work of Benjamin Arditi and Jacques Ranciere as two 
examples of inroads made into establishing a theoretical framework and deeper conceptual 
understanding of populism in the contemporary era, and lastly we will turn to Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj 
Zizek in order to construct a meaningful framework and conceptual thrust to employ in our analysis of 
South African populism.   
 
 
A Seemingly “Vague” Entity 
                                                          
8
 Zizek, S. ‘Against the Populist Temptation’, pg. 1 
9
 Corduwener, P. ‘The Relationship between Populism and Liberal Democracy: Three New Insights’, pg. 16 
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If we are to attempt an analysis of populist features it is important that a definition and theoretical 
structure of the term itself be established in order to further our analysis. By tracing the historical 
conceptual and literal meanings applied to the term “populist” we would discover an evolving 
typological characteristic as the term is and continues to be used in diverse geographical locations – 
each with their own distinct and unique economic, political and social environments. However, when we 
analyse the literature we perceive a rhetoric that elaborates either on the concept in general terms of 
class or on an even more limited notion of the general “will of the people”10. As we shall see examples 
that are often eluded to despite this preconception that we might assume of a populist definitional 
heterogeneity based on geographical differences, the reality of the term’s use appears to be one of a far 
more universal nature (in terms of generality), and more importantly appears – on the surface – to be a 
“vague” concept when attempting to define a political, social, or economic movement (or political 
action in general) as “populist”. 
 
Two main historical class-based examples given as cases focus on the mass action of small-scale North 
American agrarian producers and conversely an intellectually-led ideological agrarian movement in 
Russia during the later years of the 19th century.11 While in North America the drivers of “popular” 
resistance were the small-scale farmers who perceived a direct threat from large-scale business and 
government agencies, in Tsarist Russia the basic agrarian producers had no such general perception of 
class-division: they were primarily influenced and led by urban intellectuals who valued the 
“communitarian lifestyle” of the peasantry for ideological reasons.  This is not to say that similarities did 
not exist between these diverse movements, as “both spoke of the ‘common man’, the small producer. 
Both saw monopoly, finance-capitalist industrialism and irresponsible government, as the chief 
obstacles to progress”, but these similarities did not ensure mutual success. In the United State the 
movement was successful, developing into a notion of a unified farmer-labour relation, while in Russia 
the intellectuals were largely unsuccessful in unifying the peasant classes into taking significant action 
and were forced back into the urban areas. Now apart from these examples explaining the concerns of a 
specific group of producers, concerned with their financial and market-economy security on the one 
hand and an ideological sentiment which wishes to change society as a whole by idolising and utilising 
                                                          
10 
Worsley, P. ‘The Concept of Populism’ in Populism: its Meanings and National Characteristics, pg. 220 
11
 Ibid. 
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the masses of the peasantry on the other, it does us no good in defining populism itself simply because 
both are described as being populist yet both were completely different, had different contexts, and 
yielded different results: in essence general similarities – apart from an agrarian-ness – were lacking.  
Populism is still indefinable for us at this point. 
 
So we now reach a point where we can clearly identify a vague/constitutively diverse (lacking specificity) 
conceptualisation of populist terminology in the historical literature. Ernesto Laclau reached a similar 
conclusion; “a persistent feature of the literature on populism is its reluctance – or difficulty – in giving 
the concept any precise meaning12” and Peter Worsley in his seminal work from 1969 – although himself 
being to an extent conceptually vague about the concept of populism – identifies that “there has never 
been a Populist International… and *no+ movements… have used any such label to identify 
themselves”13.  What is perhaps most striking at this point of the analysis is that we reach a position of 
irony: if populism is obviously not being traditionally described as similar in political movement types, 
but is instead heterogeneous, then we should imply a different meaning to the term within different 
contexts. This is obviously not something which would be useful to us if we want to explain general 
populist characteristics and expressions simply because we want to find a logic to the idea of populism 
that can be expresses homogenously. 
 
Furthermore, aren’t all forms of political expression driven by a type of logic – a way of perceiving 
common demands amongst a group of people and articulating this demand in an attempt to fulfil it? 
Therefore, if we were to follow from the aforementioned literature’s understanding (or lack thereof) 
and attempt to apply it to South Africa’s rich and diverse race, class and socio-economic relations, 
almost no ground would be made in identifying a populist identity and element in its socio-political 
landscape. Therefore I propose, as Laclau does, that we need to develop our theoretical understanding 
of populism further in order to achieve a theoretical and practical clarity that can be used as a 
framework for understanding empirical evidence in the South African context. But first let us attempt to 
identify general characteristics of manifested political movements through a critical analysis of Benjamin 
Arditi and Jacques Ranciere. 
                                                          
12 
Laclau, E. ‘Populism: Ambiguities and Paradoxes’ in On Populist Reason, pg. 3 
13
 Worsley, P. ‘The Concept of Populism’ in Populism: its Meanings and National Characteristics, pg. 218 
- 19 - 
 
 
Where to Find Meaning 
Benjamin Arditi: 
Arditi’s attempt in Populism, or, Politics at the Edge of Democracy aims at characterising populism within 
democratic societies, and, although not an attempt per se at constructing a theoretical grounding for 
populism, his argument sheds light on the relationship between the state institutions of democracy, 
politics, and the imaginative conceptions brought about in the minds of individuals in society in general 
as they bear witness to this relationship. Through a comparative study of the intellectual attempts at 
populism since the last decades of the 20th century, namely those such as Laclau, Zizek, Canovan, 
Worsley, de Ipola, Manin, Rancier and others, Arditi sifts through and intertwines these ideas, 
postulating three kinds of populism extant in contemporary democratic politics: namely that of 
‘populism as a mode of political representation’, ‘populism as a symptom of democratic politics’, and 
lastly ‘populism as an underside of democracy’14.   
 
In the first instance Arditi argues that populism as a response to a lack of representation (echoing Laclau 
in some ways) is a common misconception, and although a few historical examples exist of this15, this 
general characterisation of elites versus the people leaves us with a vague answer to the question of 
who the people are; we fall into the old trap of common misrecognition in ‘audience democracy’16. 
Arditi writes: 
 
Populism departs somewhat from this view [...] as a mode of representation it rests on a 
crossover between ‘acting for others’, the re-entry of authorization under the guise of a thrust 
for the leader, and a strong symbolic dimension that seeks to produce an effect of virtual 
                                                          
14
 Arditi, B. ‘Populism, or, politics at the edge of democracy’, pgs. 20, 25, 27  
15
 Arditi, B. pg. 22 
16
 Ibid., pg. 24 
- 20 - 
 
immediacy, that is, an imaginary identification that suspends between the masses and 
authorities.17 
 
This form, Arditi argues, is that which is commonly associated with so-called demagogues. Political 
leaders or election campaign runners build their strategy around ‘populist modes of representation’18, 
signifying themselves as leaders of change and representatives of the people.  
 
The second instance is identifiable as an entity that belongs at the same time to democracy – as a mode 
of representation – but also as a ‘paradoxical element’19 of internal disruption. This internal disruption is 
made manifest by the mobility offered by populism to political causes: its unification of the ‘the people’ 
and the rhetoric surrounding populism discourse places stress on the institutional functionality of 
representative democracy20 as it encourages change through a bypassing of said order. In Arditi’s words: 
 
“Put differently, the populist challenge undermines the fullness of any democratic expression of 
the will of the people, including its own.”21 
 
This disruption goes further however in populism expressing itself as a ‘symptom of the gentrified’ (in 
the Zizekian sense) domain of democracy. Whilst those who live in the democratic order are made 
ignorant to the abuses of it or contradictions within it (hence being gentrified) populism ‘brings back the 
disruptive “noise” of the people’ which exposes the negativity of the political and announces the 
‘contingency of all political arrangements’22. The outcome of this, according to Arditi’s interpretation of 
Canovan and Zizek, is that populism disrupts the gentrification of the normal and re-asserts the 
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importance of the people in the normal. As a side effect however, its own disconnection and self-
consciousness of the gentrified allocates it to a position on the fringe of the normal – or democratic 
politics; and its characteristic definition is obfuscated by this position.  
 
The third instance of populism: as not an “other” to democracy but rather is conceived as an underside, 
and furthermore, not to be argued as a danger to the democratic political as democracy itself is exposed 
to a multitude of harmful undersides – populist or not. It is the very functioning of democracy itself that 
exposes its underside to alternative political social movements. Building on Lefort, Arditi argues: 
 
“This *exposure+ arises when the exacerbation of conflicts cannot be resolved symbolically in the 
political sphere and a sense of social fragmentation pervades society. [It is here then, that] there is 
a Real possibility for the development of the ‘fantasy of the People-as-One, the beginnings of the 
quest for a substantial identity, for a social body that is welded to its head, for an embodying 
power, for a state free from division’.”23  
 
Arditi’s analysis of the characteristics of populism in democratic contemporary societies highlights 
important points which help to identify inroads made into conceptualising and framing populism. Firstly 
that populism is a productive positive force in representation and harnessing social movements that 
seek redress. Secondly, populism is itself a symptom of the political; democratic politics is always 
exposed to populist sentiment and ‘an inquiry into populism is an inquiry into democratic politics’24 itself 
(this is highly relevant to what we shall do later). Lastly, whilst populism is capable of being ushered into 
a relatively negative political force (i.e. violent, dismissive of liberal ideas of justice, etc.) its identification 
and characteristics reflects a distinctive politics of Lack in the democratic domain. Therefore Arditi’s 
analyses can help us in using a practical framework of reflection (a mirror, if you will) through which to 
view the theoretical attempts by Laclau and Zizek, and could also possibly help us identify synonymous 
characteristics in contemporary South African politics. 
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Jacques Ranciere: 
Ranciere’s insights into the political centred on what he viewed to be a dissensus. In a given social order, 
one which is hierarchical in nature (be it democracy, fascism, etc.) an affective social movement of 
collective self-recognition is based on a self-realisation of equal status with those above them in the 
hierarchical order25. As individuals recognise their shared position and therefore solidarity with one 
another (or equivalence in the Laclauian sense) the collective action of said group pre-supposes a 
conscious or subconscious equality with those they oppose. This process disrupts the social order and 
reveals its ‘perceptual and epistemic underpinnings..., the obviousness and naturalness of the order’26. 
In this conception of political logic Ranciere provides us with a construct of the collective we.  
 
This construct is not merely progressive in providing a political platform for voice but instrumentally 
alters the prevailing social order or social whole itself. Ranciere went further into a discussion of the role 
populism plays within this conception: as a “voice” for the poor or the oppressed, a voice which is 
however denounced by the prevailing social order.  
 
“The term is not used to characterize any well-defined political force. It denotes neither an 
ideology nor even a coherent political style. It serves simply to draw the image of a certain 
people. For 'the people' as such does not exist. What exists are diverse and even antagonistic 
images of the people, figures constructed by privileging certain modes of assembly, certain 
distinctive features, certain capacities or incapacities. The notion of populism constructs a 
people characterized by the fearsome combination of a certain capacity – the raw power of a 
large number – and a certain incapacity – the ignorance ascribed to the same large 
number.”27 
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Thus while the ‘scandal of democracy’ is interrupted (or democracy prevented from being elitist) the 
“people” in the populist conception cannot be a part of the polis. The usefulness of this conception as a 
theoretical and conceptual linkage with Ardit, Laclau and Zizek cannot be understated; and its 
usefulness in identifying the characteristics and possible alterations of populism to the political order in 
South Africa is crucial as it yet again shows us an inherent link between populism and exclusions to a 
social order.  
 
A Meaningful Framework 
Now that we have established, through Arditi and Ranciere, a typological understanding of the various 
manifestations of populism in general terms we shall embark upon the construction of a theoretical 
framework that can be used in analysing South African manifestations of populism in specific case 
studies. In order to do so we shall rely on the theories of Hegemony, Radical Democracy, and Populism 
proposed by Ernesto Laclau, and Antagonism proposed by Slavoj Zizek. We shall use these 
conceptualisations not only in conjunction with each other – as they complement and critique each 
other to a degree – but also as a departure point in “filling the gap” so to speak and the eventual 
proposition of expanding these concepts.   
 
Ernesto Laclau: 
Laclau has devoted much time and effort at an understanding and re-formulation of populism and the 
supposed vagueness associated with it resulting in his most recent efforts being projected at the 
argumentation of populism as the underlying logic of the political itself.  
 
…Is not the “vagueness” of populist discourses the consequence of social Reality itself being, 
in some situations, vague and undetermined? And in that case wouldn’t populism be, rather 
than a clumsy political and ideological operation, a performative act endowed with the 
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rationality of its own – that is to say, in some situations, vagueness is a precondition to 
constructing relevant meanings?’28 
 
Three points within Laclau’s work on populism are crucial for unpacking what is meant by this construct: 
Firstly, ‘hegemony as the process of (re)constituting the social order’, secondly, a ‘normative idea of 
radical democracy’, and thirdly, ‘populism as the politics of radical democracy’29.    
 
Hegemony: 
Informed by an earlier discussion with Butler and Zizek on Universality and Contingency as well as his 
previous work with Chantal Mouffe on Hegemony, Laclau conceptualises the political as being 
“composed of never complete orders… *or what+ Laclau calls ‘discourses’… *composed of+ both material 
and ideational elements into the structuring of one particular order.”30 From this the political is 
considered to constitute the social, all social interaction being political in nature and expressed through 
hegemonic struggles: in other words the political’s exertion on/determination of the social is a 
‘process’31. The process itself is explained by Laclau through the conceptual entity of heterogeneity, or 
the process by which the empty/only-ever partially filled subject only-ever identifies her-self with 
undecidability. Complicated language aside, this means that a subject within the social order is 
contingently recognised by said order and therefore the identity of the subject (or you and I) never has a 
wholly positive understanding of the self within the social order. As Rasmus Neilsen identifies through a 
good example in his analysis of Laclau:  
 
“A refugee or migrant *enters+ the social order structured around a… notion of individuals as 
carriers of rights… *and while+ her appearance is registered… her representation in the social 
order as being simultaneously who she appears to be in particular (from somewhere else), 
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[who] she appears to be in general (an individual), and what [this] is [held] to entail within 
the [social order], is denied at the level of being. She is an individual, but she is not what the 
order suggests being an individual normally entails. She therefore appears as a 
heterogeneous element that has no clear insertion in the social order.”32      
 
Following from this the subject is aware of its own dislocation within the social order purely based 
upon this interaction with the order through the different identifications of being listed in the 
example above. The ontological nature of the subject is therefore defined and underpinned by its 
own heterogeneity within the social order and this in turn gives rise to the subjects dislocation of 
identity and thusly its own ‘deficiency’ and the ‘deficiency’ of the order itself.33 In Zizekian terms, 
there is always a Lack with the social order and for Laclau the Lack is in fact the constitutive 
process of hegemony as sets of social demands arise as a result of this Lack (or the awareness of 
the subjects own dislocation). Specifically social demands arise within the order or outside the 
social order when chains of equivalence (recognition of self-dislocation and the dislocation of 
others and homogenising them) are made by heterogeneous subjects. Following from this a social 
demand is itself an ambiguity, pertaining to either a “request or a claim”34, and thus contains a 
connotation of vagueness but it is the connotation of vagueness itself which carries with it the 
means to construct a “relevant meaning” that articulates social demands as ‘*those things+ that 
cannot be satisfied through self-management’.35 It is at this point that Laclau argues that the 
hegemonic ‘operation’ begins in actuality36: at the point where social demands can produce a 
dichotometic effect with the social order and provide ground-work for change (positive, negative, 
or both) within the order.   
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Radical Democracy: 
Laclau’s view on heterogeneity and hegemony (as explained above) lead him towards a theorisation of 
radical democracy as being the normative process through which the ‘contingent’37 relationship 
between hegemony and radical democracy can be identified. Or as Nielson explains: 
 
‘The theory of the political means that the pursuit of radical democracies in the world will 
always entail hegemonic processes… *and+ the normative theory tries to identify the traits 
that will allow one to identify hegemonic process in the world as having a radically 
democratic thrust.’38  
 
As shown above in the discussion on hegemony, the theory of radical democracy does not by 
necessity need to entail specificity about the type of democratic society that should exist (it can be 
positive, negative, or both) but rather is underpinned by ‘good political struggles’ that are aware of 
contingency and hegemony of the social (i.e. the dislocation of the subject) and thusly constitute 
subjectivities themselves39. Nielson however points out a problem of distinction between what 
constitutes ‘constitutive subjectivities’ within ‘democratic and non-democratic’ systems40 and sifts 
through Laclau’s considerable volume of writing in order to identify a solution to this issue, which I 
will borrow in our identification of radical democracy.   
 
Nielson rectifies an insistence on labelling those relegated to the position of exclusion from the 
social order as ‘underdogs’ and thereby from falling into the habit of viewing these exclusions as 
existing within an oppressor-oppressed dichotomy. This is done by dismissing a link of 
generalisation in regards to oppression, as oppression is extant only as “oppressions”41 and this is 
precisely because ‘patterns of inclusion/exclusion do not necessarily converge in homogenising 
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patterns.42 The theory of hegemony itself has to reject assumptions about inequality being 
universally rectified into equality, a so called end-point of the democratic effort in which 
exclusions do not exist and all are included. In short, the interaction of particularities results in the 
universal43 and is exemplified by crisis in capitalism in one point of an imperialist chain resulting in 
dislocations at many other points44.  Radical democracy – following from hegemony – is then the 
‘one which permanently shows the contingency of its own foundations… *and is capable+ of re-
launching new emancipatory projects which are compatible with the complex multiplicities of 
differences shaping the fabric of present-day societies…45 This allows us then to see inclusions and 
exclusions based around dislocations instead of a reliance on the narratives of the purely 
historically oppressed and oppressing.  
 
Populism: 
We saw in the coverage of Arditi and Ranciere that populism takes a wide variety of different forms in 
classical conceptualisations of it and that we cannot therefore attribute it to any one specific instance of 
political method or ideology without struggling with vagueness in characterisation and any sort of 
normative behaviour. Laclau supports this understanding and uses his theory of hegemony and radical 
democracy to argue for populism as the form of politics not only extant, but as a vehicle for change in 
the latter when seen as a part of the chain in the hegemony, radical democracy, populism “dialectic”. 
Thusly populism functions as follows, we shall be using an example of a township to relate this in a 
practical sense. When services (such as let us say, electricity) are perceived by an individual to go 
unanswered within such an environment a demand is made upon the state (through whichever local 
councillor represents that individual) to provide whatever is lacking (the electricity to his/her home) but 
also as a demand in the more universal sense of what we described above (dislocation). In a society in 
which the state functions efficiently and has the necessary resources and infrastructure needed to 
supply the demand with an answer (providing the electricity) the demands do not go any further46. 
These societies are structured for Laclau as a structure with many horizontal differences; each 
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‘alley/avenue’ is a demand that is answered by the state horizontally:  the Logic of difference has 
prevailed in these societies, fixing each difference ‘alley/avenue’ as they arise. However, if over time 
that demand goes increasingly unanswered by the state then that individual starts to recognise the 
same demand in relation to those around him: he/she becomes conscious of the demand existing 
outside of his/her own home.  
 
The demands itself gains equivalence in the community by its shared persistence amongst many 
members of a group and the equivalence relationship stands a chance of being enhanced to the point of 
that group not identifying with the institution any more as long as the demands are not met 
systematically (or differentially) by the state47. Giving the example of shantytowns means that the 
demand is not singular in nature, there can be (and often are) many such demands, which in turn 
precipitates an increase in equivalence and necessitates dissatisfaction. In a case such as South Africa 
these demands do not occur in isolation, within one shantytown alone; the “Logic of equivalence” grows 
and society as a whole becomes conscious of the unanswered demands (we shall test this in the case 
studies). This process results in what Lacalu refers to as the internal dichotomy of society48, in which it is 
constituted by two prevailing layers, these two layers represent those at the bottom and those at the 
top (in a very general sense). The appeal of populism is an appeal to those at the bottom (dislocated and 
equivelated) against those at the top (again, very generally): the former constituting populists (in their 
collective identification against the ‘other’) and the latter comprising the extant social order. Once this 
dichotomy comes into being, through whatever historical processes construct it, an eventual populist 
rupture will occur within society and this rupture can be represented by any form of political ideology; 
be it totalitarian, radical libertarian or even centrist. Populism therefore is an open subject in and of 
itself, it be represented by any political discourse that fills this subject within a certain set of outside 
articulations. It is in essence interpolated. This, the formulation of society as dichotomy, is the central 
process of political logic applied to society itself. Social identity itself is formulated by the distinction 
between difference and equivalence and can be moulded into any diverse forms and types of discourse 
that articulates to that specific (by its contextual nature) social identity. Thus populism can be left-wing, 
centrist, right-wing or radical. This “openness” is what makes populism such an important facet of what 
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Laclau perceives it to be: as a vehicle that self-constitutes according to heterogeneous links in a process 
of hegemony.  
 
Slavoj Zizek 
Although Zizek ultimately disagrees with Laclau on the end-point of the aforementioned process his 
analysis is strikingly relevant to conceptualising populism in contemporary South Africa. The 
dichotometic and the equivelential links in a social environ that experiences antagonism is highly 
relevant. Zizek’s concern with populism initially ideologically rested upon similar foundations such as 
those expressed by Laclau and Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy but eventually departed or 
diverged from Laclau in more recent years over the conception of the universal and therefore the end-
point of populism mentioned before. For the purpose of this review I shall be focusing on Zizek’s 
writings in The Sublime Object of Ideology (although he later disagrees with what he posited in this 
work) and his contribution to the debate in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (with Laclau and Judith 
Butler) amongst others.  
 
Building upon Lacanian psychoanalytical thought, in particular Lacan’s conception of enjoyment (or 
jouissance49) Zizek sets out in The Sublime Object an analysis of human nature in contemporary 
democracies; dealing with the conception of universality and the link this provides between ‘universal 
democracy and democratic practice’50. The result of this conceptual effort on Zizek’s part is one in which 
we are left with a conclusion of democracy as something which is accompanied by the other (non-
democracies). Democracy is imperfect, it is open to the abuses of individuals and leaves much to be 
desired, but it is when we attempt to rectify the institutional limitations that allow for these abuses – 
through legislative or executive means – that democracy itself (or what it claims to be) is lost51. The very 
action that seeks to heal, in turn, damages. Now while the point is not here to reject democracy as a 
legitimate form of government Zizek’s analysis and position on universality does show similarities with 
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Arditi’s conception of an underside of democracy and indeed reflects Laclau’s leaning towards a concept 
or radical democracy as we explored earlier. 
 
Building further from this Zizek’s conception of democratic politics evolves in For They Know Not What 
They Do: Enjoyment as Political Factor into an analysis that takes the subject of Lack in the object of 
democracy. Its continual processes of functionality are always exposed by its own limitation as a 
common object (Lacan’s influence); complicated philosophical conceptions aside:  
 
“... we can’t have democracy without deficiency, no matter how hard we might try: democracy is 
not the petit objet a, an ultimate object of desire. It is rather an everyday object like any other.” 52 
 
Antagonism: 
Another important aspect that comes out of Zizek’s thought, and could prove useful in a discussion of 
populist movements in South Africa, is that of political conflict being characterised as conflict between 
the ordered social whole and those outside of it; or a relational nature by virtue of this relation that is 
antagonistic. In this sense populism would always constitute an antagonistic and opposing force to the 
democratic. It’s here ultimately that Zizek is in disagreement with Laclau’s perception of the end-role 
and/or function of populism. Whilst both agree on the need of populism to construct or have a symbolic 
“enemy” in order to justify itself53 Laclau sees populism as an underlying logic in the political itself (in On 
Populist Reason at least) and Zizek rather views it as an entity that cannot function nor realise its own 
existence without the utter destruction of the prevailing social order – i.e. democracy (albeit linked with 
capitalism). In other words, Laclau views populism as the revolutionary vehicle of social change and 
politics/the political while Zizek focused on the potential violent outcomes (in both the physical and 
symbolic sense) associated with populist politics. This does not mean we should not be able to 
intertwine the two to a degree, however, as I believe the disagreement on the end-point of Laclau’s 
process does not deny a complimentary nature with antagonism.  
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Relegating populism into a position of antagonism says nothing (in my belief) more than what Laclau 
himself says: that its very existence is constituted by the dislocation of those subjects outside of the 
social order. Would these subjects not seek to deny (through change – violent or not) the very order 
which dislocated them? Are they not the constitutive Lack in the social order made Real? Zizek has a 
point to make when he argues that the social order itself is in danger of destruction by populism but it 
appears to be a stretch of imagination to argue that this is by necessity an end-point to be avoided. 
Laclau himself argues that as an open object/performative vehicle (re subject) populism is always open 
to any constitution of dislocation through equivalence and that the entire point of radical democracy is 
to identify which of these are “good” political struggles within whichever hegemonic process they arise 
out of. Zizek here seems to be avoiding an actual attempt at putting populism into practice. Despite this 
quibble the theory of antagonism is a good addition to the work of Laclau as we can (by avoiding an 
implication of an end-point of total destruction) use it to identify disruption of the social order. It is in 
this disruption that I believe the signifiers of the Lack in the social order exist and we hope to find 
identify this within the case study chapters of the research report. But first we shall move onto an 
analysis of the South African literature on our topic.  
 
Chapter 3 
Review of the South African Literature 
 
Introduction 
The Literature on populism in South African mimics that of the international trend (highlighted in the 
general literature review above) by the nature of its diverse meanings throughout the last three 
decades. The earliest mentions of the term (as far as we were able to find) appears in the works of 
Michael Neocosmos in 198254, Michael Vaughan in 198555 , and William Beinart in 198756. By and large 
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these appear at the beginning of the end of the era of the United Democratic Front(UDF) with its civic 
organisations and other popular political, social, economic, and rural movements that existed in the 
vacuum left by the banning of the ANC, SACP, and Pan African Congress (PAC) in the 1960s. Since then 
the term was increasingly used, transitioning from non-existent to rare and then becoming more 
common to explain the post-2006 era of President Jacob Zuma and the rise of the EFF. Since this 
research report is concerned with contemporary politics of South Africa we shall only briefly analyse the 
pre-1994 literature and shall rather focus on more recent usages of the term by Gillian Hart, Ralph 
Mathegka, C.R.D. Halisi, and Sabelo J. Ndlovo-Gatsheni. Articulations of populism in the recent (post-
1994) literature have tied in with specific cases of grievances experienced in the new South Africa, 
thereby allowing the authors to explore the concept in more depth as part of a relationship to 
dissatisfaction with ANC hegemony, failures of the idea of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), 
and concerns with Nationalism. Due to the diverse applications of meaning behind the term, each 
author’s use of the term will be explored in turn chronologically.  
 
C.R.D. Halisi - ‘Citizenship and Populism in the New South Africa’ 
C.R.D. Halisi focuses on populism in ‘Citizenship and Populism in the New South Africa’ (1998) along lines 
of popular expressions of “the people”. Within this frame he identifies such expressions as ‘unique 
national, cultural, class, ethnic, or racial identities’57 thereby arguing that the sphere of influence within 
which populism functions as an entity is located ‘between conceptions of popular and democratic 
government’.58 Halisi’s takes the argument of distinguishing between liberation ideals centred around 
race and class identities in juxtaposition to the construction of a democratic constitutional identity in 
post-Apartheid South Africa. It is from this point that Halisi argues that these ‘polarities of thought’59 
continue to struggle in the public debate around non-racialism versus racial-consciousness. Halisi 
therefore perceives of populism as being inherently linked to the concept of popularity, whereby the 
political expression of the ideals of liberation (and in his argument, democratic constitutional 
citizenship) confront those of non-racialism via a radical voice. This confrontation is thusly violent, and 
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not entirely within the bounds of a debate: there is therefore a concern, for Halisi, in contemporary 
South Africa a danger in the modes of “populist” struggles: 
 
“…formerly disenfranchised people are often apt to regard the fight for citizenship rights, and 
by extension racial reconciliation, as co-opting designed to blunt the radical edge of social 
movement politics.” 60    
 
And this “stubborn” voice, fearful of “meaningful” change exists as place holder of alternative modes of 
expression that need to be developed (through the denial of populist “values”) in order for ‘time-
honoured Western values’61 to assert themselves in constructing “positive” identities. This approach to 
populism is restrictive (as shown in the general literature review in Chapter 2) as it posits populism 
within anti-liberal democratic modes of political expression. This is made apparent as Halisi relegates 
what he identifies as populist movements within political movements and parties that take “radical” 
(rather than “logical”) approaches to economic, race, class and social positions, such as the Azanian 
People’s Organization (AZAPO), the PAC and the SACP. This limits these to oppositional positions in the 
“new” democratic South Africa, hence in opposition to the dominant democratic order. Halisi does 
however in the last section of the article suggest that populism is open in nature, a political vehicle that 
can incorporate various ideological concerns and political stances (left, right, or centre) according to 
different and diverse situations. This is an important insight that allows for a more open interpretation 
of populism as a form of politics. The outcomes can never be determined. However, it may also be 
restrictive, as it does not entail a non-reasonable approach because of this ability to touch on normative 
aspects of what we consider in this research report. 
 
As an aside: Halisi’s argument is filled with many assumptions about what constitutes populist struggles 
and acts in this literature review as signifier of the pejorative employment of the term, not only 
internationally, but locally. This is not unique to Halisi’s article nor does it invalidate any arguments 
made by those who do employ the term in a negative manner. Rather it is useful to us in highlighting 
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that what for one person is a mode of normative and positive methods of re-articulation in democratic 
ideology (tied to capitalism), is for another the antithesis to the protection of the individual from the 
excesses of the community. It is important to us to note this, as we cannot de facto declare what the 
interpretation of the term populist means, we can only theorise as to its constitutive nature and attempt 
to understand contemporary practices, trends, events and movements in the political through such a 
framework.62  
 
Sabelo J. Ndlovo-Gatsheni – ‘Black Republican Tradition, Nativism and Populist Politics in 
South Africa’ 
Sabelo Ndlovo-Gatsheni’s addresses the rise of the Native Club and the interpretations and criticisms of 
its nativist ideological outlook in ‘Black Republican Tradition, Nativism and Populist Politics in South 
Africa’ (2008). He argues that these perceptions of the Native Club have been limited in their framing of 
it as a ‘threat to the spirit of “Rainbowism”’63 and to the larger question of the construction of 
citizenship identity in South Africa. To address this concern he works towards framing the Native Club 
within the larger conflicted political spaces of ‘the National question’, conceptualisations of nationhood 
and the nation, the ‘contested definitions of the teleology of the liberation struggle’, and ‘visions of 
citizenship and democracy’.64 The end-point and theoretical link to populism in his argument is to frame 
the ‘logic and dangers’ of nativism alongside the rise, resurgence and crystallisation65 of populist politics 
under Jacob Zuma’s administration.  
 
Ndlovo-Gatsheni’s article is worth an investigation as it is one of the few that deals with Laclau’s 
formulation of populism (his specific formulation in On Populist Reason) in an analysis of South Africa. 
Noting the key aspect of Laclau’s theory as: 
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‘…involving constructions and reconstructions of popular identities based on the mobilisation 
of ensembles of strategies and making possible the emergence of ‘the people’ both as a 
collective actor and as an authentic democratic subject’66 
  
Ndlovo-Gatsheni unpacks the personal politics (shown by his use of Mshini Wami) of Jacob Zuma (before 
his election into the presidency) in order to show Zuma as a successful articulator of populist sentiments 
and ideals67 and thereby give credence to his argument of the ANC as a body that is composed of, and 
incorporates, diverse ideological meanings and contradictions. This is specifically pointed out as 
highlighted in the Tripartite Alliance and its ever-apparent internal cleavages. However Ndlovo-
Gatsheni’s conceptualisation, although relying, rightly, on Laclau, tends to conflate populism with 
popular politics. Although he makes an interesting point in stating that the Zuma administration is 
‘representing a populist re-articulation of the NDR’68 he is overtly stepping away from his use of Laclau 
by simplifying the relationship between “the people” and the established social order in the assumption 
of Zuma as representative of populism in South Africa. In his final point of the argument, Ndlovo-
Gatsheni argues that the Native Club and nativism itself in South Africa is an internalisation and co-
option of PAC values by the ANC, and links with the populist politics of the Zuma administration as an 
attempt to re-introduce black intellectual thought into articulating the NDR that had re-injected itself 
under the Mbeki administration as a result of the complex issues surrounding the question of “the 
nation” in the new South Africa.  
 
Ralph Mathekga – ‘The ANC ‘Leadership Crisis’ and the Age of Populism in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa’ 
Ralph Mathegka’s chapter in African Politics: Beyond the Third Wave of Democratization (2009) focuses 
on how the ANC leadership has come to centre itself around the narratives of ‘leader of the liberation 
movement and the transformation process in South Africa since 199469 and how, following from this, 
concerning events around 2006 – 2008 were being reacted to by the ANC and consequently opening up 
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a space for a populist agenda in the space of a crisis of leadership under Thabo Mbeki.70 Focusing on the 
internal political alignments under Mbeki, Mathegka shifts towards a search for internal location of an 
ideology within the ANC. Mathekga recognises a similar contradictory nature around policy formation 
that Gillian Hart points out in relation to ideology as a construct of policy through the NDR (GEAR in this 
instance) and an increasing shift away from, or even ignoring the Tripartite-Alliance relations. This, 
Mathegka argues caused an eventual weakening of the Party (and the subsequent leadership crisis). This 
was furthermore aggravated by economic concerns through rapid market reforms that 
disproportionately increased economic inequality and hampered transformation policies, creating the 
space for what Mathekga conceives as the rise of populism.  
 
For Mathekga populism appears to be a symptom of a disease that plagues, and creates the veritable 
sickling that “is” a democratic system – a system which has fallen prey to ‘over-bureaucratization’.71 He 
argues that populism is the result of inefficiency in a democratic system, inefficiency brought about by 
the erosion of institutional and legal practices supported by the state and presided over by technocrats. 
When these weaken through over-bloated-ness, Mathekga argues, the citizenry is slowly removed from 
participation in the democratic process and populism rises in an effort to re-introduce them. The people 
in this reactive sense are then a re-injection of the “sovereign will of the people”72. In this respect it is 
fair to say that populism for Mathekga is not an entirely positive phenomenon but rather a negative 
process through an inevitable logic of reaction against failing/failed democracy. Here he mimics an 
understanding of populism as a dangerous undercurrent in democratic society, which arises only in 
times of democratic deficiency or failures. Furthermore, Mathekga does not give any real explanation 
about how populism supposedly operates outside of the dichotomy shown above and instead simply 
states that it is an ‘interpellation on democracy’.73 This forces his reliance on an understanding of 
populism (although he explores Cannovan) as a political tool of those seeking redress in the vacuum of 
democratic failures. Nevertheless, Mathekga’s analysis of the ANC, its internal ideological 
contradistinctions and contradictions – stressed by adoptions of neo-liberal policies that clashed with 
the values of meaningful economic, social, and political transformation espoused in the early NDR – as 
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well as its crisis around leadership battles during the mid-2000s provides an interesting analysis of ANC 
strategy and action in the early 21st century.  
 
Gillian Hart – Rethinking the South African Crisis 
Gillian Hart’s recent (2014) exploration of the South African “question” in Rethinking the South African 
Crisis: Nationalism, Populism, Hegemony is perhaps the most concise and relevant – as well as being the 
most recent –book available on the topic of populism at the local level.  Hart approaches the South 
African “crisis’ through a predominantly Gramscian analysis of hegemony, praxis and passive revolution 
while adding her own take on Fanon’s conceptualisation of Nationalism in constructing her theoretical 
framework of de-nationalisation and re-nationalisation. This is done in order to deconstruct ANC 
hegemonic practices ‘and its contradictions’74 within the last 20 years and to give sense to movements 
that have arisen in opposition to ANC hegemony and its contradictions.  
 
As stated above the key part of Hart’s argument essentially rests on her employment of the concepts of 
denationalisation and renationalisation. The former concept is held to entail the process by which 
capital re-constituted itself within a neo-liberal paradigm in synthesis with the global market system in 
the transition and immediate post-Apartheid years. The incorporation of capital into the negotiated end 
of Apartheid heralded a shift in the NDR project towards a project of Nationalism that fed into the 
ideological threads of liberation: nationalism, liberal democracy, and socialist paradigms. The latter 
concept, as informed by the theory of passive revolution, looks at understanding and framing how the 
post-apartheid nation was produced out of the effort of denationalisation. By this process 
renationalisation also addresses the importance of on-going articulations of the nation in the hegemonic 
project of the ANC. 
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Using Gramsci’s theory of hegemony as expressed in a ‘dialectal integration of hegemony with 
domination, of consent with coercion, united in their distinction’75 Hart moves into a discussion of 
populism in South Africa. Hart writes: 
 
… *The+ articulations of the nation, liberation and the NDR are central to the ANC’s 
hegemonic project. Far from just a matter of false consciousness or manipulations from 
above, these articulations tap into and draw upon popular understandings, memories and 
meanings of racial oppression, racialised dispossession and struggles for freedom.76 
 
While she relies on Laclau’s earlier interpretations of populism Hart takes issue with “populism as logic 
of the political” that he later developed in On Populist Reason. Accusing him of ‘re-inventing the 
manipulated mindless masses model’77 Hart instead focuses her understanding on Laclau’s concept of 
socialist and bourgeois populism in his earlier work in ‘Towards a Theory of Populism78 as it is more 
relevant to trying to understand the relationship between Nationalism and Class. By doing this Hart is 
able to incorporate Laclau’s early theory on populism into her denationalisation and renationalisation 
thesis thereby weaving these paradigms through the changing South African political scene under Thabo 
Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, through to the rise of Julius Malema and the post-Marikana context in order to 
underpin a populist “response” to ANC hegemony. This application implies that Mbeki sought to 
neutralise the revolutionary potential of popular antagonisms, while Zuma sought to develop them but 
contain them within certain limits, and Malema sought to capture and amplify the revolutionary 
potential of popular antagonisms – generating a dynamic that the SACP maintains ‘has tended towards 
fascism’.79 This last point is highly relevant for this research in giving sense to the site of the capturing of 
dislocated subject and chains of equivalence and thereby attempts to conceptualise forms that may well 
capture or perhaps create universal vehicles of radical democratic struggles.   
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Conclusion 
Having analysed the main approaches in the literature on populism in post-Apartheid South Africa we 
have encountered a diverse approach to the topic in relation to specific experiences in the unique South 
African political and historical environment. The literature has furthermore shown to embody an 
evolutionary characteristic in the approach taken towards a framing of the role of populism within South 
African politics (as was argued in the introduction). We have seen that this evolution started off with the 
framing of populism as a mode of  an “open” (susceptible to capture by ideology) representation in 
relation to the question of the nation and citizenship (Halisi) but one that tended to be expressed as a 
danger to democratic liberal politics. The stance then moved on to an application of the concept to the 
characterisation of leader politics within the ANC itself (Ndlovo-Gatsheni), periodising the leadership 
and its mobilisation of strategies that evoked reconstitutions of “the people” in the evolving language of 
the NDR. Thought on South African populism in the next instance (merely a year later in Mathegka) 
highlights the duality of applied substance to the concept of populism itself: in that it argued for its 
arising in the political as purely the result of failed/failing democracies.  
 
While this is not incorrect in placing populism in the “underside” of democracy it tends to frame populist 
moments as “eruptions”, which carry with them dangerous tendencies or consequences. However, this 
does adequately illustrate the argument made in the introduction of this research report on the diverse 
connotations attached to the concept we are exploring. In the most recent instance of academic 
thought on the topic (Hart), we witnessed the conjoining of populism to the complex debates and 
analyses of the linkages between economics and politics and the hegemonic processes that guided and 
managed these since 1994. Therefore the concept of populism has become a political concept that is 
increasingly sought out as a topic of analysis and debate within South African politics, society, and 
economics (and their interrelations) and is not only used as a identifier of “dangerous” social action 
(through rejection) of established political systems (or dominant social order). In the practical 
application of the theory into the context of our South African case studies we are provided with an 
extension of our original literature review into our contemporary setting, allowing us a better 
understanding and “fleshing out” of the complexities involved with the concept of populism in South 
Africa. The research report shall now move on to engage with the case studies. 
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Chapter 4 
Case Studies 
 
Introduction 
In order to justify the main premise of the research report – that populism is both active and effective in 
South African politics – we now turn to an examination of two spheres of political and social unrest that 
have appeared as concerns on the national level in recent South African history. The initial effort of the 
case studies will focus on the perspective of labour in South Africa and the social, economic, and 
political aspects surrounding it as expressed through ANC hegemony. First and foremost we shall look 
towards Marikana and the crisis of labour and unions that violently entered the political and public 
scene in 2012 with a massacre of workers by police on August 16th, 2012. Secondly we shall turn towards 
a parallel examination of the Western Cape farm worker strikes of the same year which expressed 
solidarity with mine workers and expressed similar, and in some instances, more serious historical 
grievances. Examining these dislocations will therefore be viewed through our theoretical lens of 
hegemony, radical democracy, populism, and antagonism in order to make our case. In order to better 
be able to frame our examination of the empirical evidence for our theoretical push we shall begin with 
a note on the role of the economic in the prevailing social order, followed by an analysis of the 
hegemonic process and processes involved in its maintenance of its relation with ANC and government. 
 
Hegemony and the Prevailing Social Order 
Vishwas Satgar also point out the importance of noting that claims of the contemporary South African 
state as being developmental through attempts at state interventions in the economy tend to ‘ignore 
the fact that a great deal of state intervention focuses on creating conditions for externalised dynamics 
of accumulation’.80 The old attempts at state-led industrialisation, and therefore job creation and 
growth through the state, as embodied in concepts such as Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) do 
simply not exist in the current global neo-liberal w0orld. When claims are made by government towards 
state interventions actual policy assumes roles that do not negate or threaten the market economy, and 
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in the global South, specifically sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa in this case, the reliance on foreign 
investment in both the private sector industries and as welfare ensures language masks actions that fall 
far from real state-led interventions framed within radical democratic approaches of participation in 
local government and capital.  As an example, while capitalist profits in South Africa had “increased from 
40% to 45% between the end of Apartheid and 2009”81 employment security had steadily decreased 
during the same time, resulting in general cost increases for workers.82 
 
Here it is therefore important to be reminded that we cannot distance the notion of the political from 
that of Capital: for this entity affects the spheres of the socio-political as a hegemonic construct informs 
our interpretations of, and relations to, both our democratic system and populism83.  The latter are 
contingent on the hegemony of the former, being limited in their ideological narratives and 
implementations by their attitude towards capital; in short they are allowed to exist as long as they do 
not threaten the existence of capital. In this sense can frame what we claim to be populist in South 
African spaces (comprised of structures) themselves when manifested in the form of political 
parties/movements. For example, the EFF is opposed to private property and is pro-nationalisation of 
industry, yet does not have any narrative of active deconstructions of capital itself, beyond “putting 
capital in its place”84 Furthermore, it is not only the system of Capital itself that cannot be removed from 
the political but economy that is in actuality ‘always-already political’85. This is crucial in understanding 
the viewpoint of the extant forces within our “postmodern” political system that reject attempts by 
populist struggles to ‘repoliticise’ capitalism86, to bring the realm of the economic back into the 
ideological battlefield of old. Therefore popular contemporary struggles are relegated in the public 
imagination to the depoliticisation of economy: mining labour strikes are an issue of corporate pay-
structures and excessive bonuses rather than a history of capital industry formations that abuse “cheap 
or unskilled” labour supplied by migrant labour, farm labour strikes is an issue of relaxed government 
regulation of commercial farm labour practices in an age of increased competition on the global market.   
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So although the vehicle of revolutionary spirit had experienced a change from socialist origins towards 
capitalist productivity the hegemonic discourse maintained its own subjugation under the spirit of the 
Big Other (in Zizekian terms). The “inevitable realisation of the truth of historical materialism” fell away 
to the ideals of “social democracy through capitalist accumulation”87 and the negotiated acquirement of 
the South African state the abandonment of the ideological narrative of revolution could not be 
achieved. The revolution was not abandoned but was to be acquired through different means. Thusly 
the ANC’s discourse of its own position still revolves around narratives of “serving the people” as the 
one true harbinger of change, and the vehicle “should not be questioned as it is in the best interests of 
the people”88.  
 
Following from the above analysis we have an assumed situation based on the following assertions:  
 
1. The shift from 1994 towards neo-liberal economic policy has limited socio-economic 
redistribution and relegated the significance of it into the realm of good governance and the 
developmental state. 
2. The ANC has reconstituted itself around such policy and houses several internal contradictions 
in its hegemonic process and ideological narrative as a result by maintaining the language of the 
classical NDR while acting through policy that supports capital and is thus in contradiction 
towards (the classical framing of) it. This has caused divisions within the Tripartite Alliance and 
in the political scene in the South African Left in general.  
3. The contradictory expression named above manifests as ideological narrative that maintains the 
language of revolutionary (and therefore radical) change for the South African subject of 
historical oppression yet through the hegemonic dominance of the ANC runs counter to the 
narrative itself. In essence it masks itself.  
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Having set the scene in South Africa and having explored the contemporary post-Apartheid socio-
economic and political atmosphere we can move on to a study of two case studies which we shall follow 
by moving (and framing the case study analyses) directly into the concluding question of radical 
democracy and populism.  
 
Case Study: Marikana Labour Crisis 
Introduction 
The 16th of August 2012 heralded a jarring shift – whether they wanted it or not – to the South African 
post-Apartheid dream of a “new” South Africa as the country witnessed 34 protesting and striking 
Lonmin mine workers gunned down by police on live television. A week earlier Marikana had played 
witness to a “sudden” wildcat strike organised by worker committees without consent from unions and 
led by rock-drill operators demanding a 20089 to 300 per cent increase in their monthly wages from +-
R4000 to R12 50090. The strikes had arisen in the context and backdrop of NUM and AMCU conflict 
surrounding worker representation within NUM and its problematic links to mining companies. 
Furthermore, COSATU and the ANC were urged on by talks of strikes in the neighbouring Amplats91 
platinum mine in Rustenburg in the preceding months.  The Marikana strikes, and the subsequent 
massacre, ensured a wave of solidarity strikes in the latter months of 2012 and the early months of 2013 
throughout mining as well as other industries (such as the farm workers of the Western Cape). While 
aspects of the media and public response to the strikes can be criticised, there exists a kernel of truth in 
the common claim that Marikana represents an upheaval in the South African labour sectors that has 
not been witnessed on such a scale since Apartheid. The massacre of workers by the police reflects 
violence against citizens (and importantly, African labour) not seen since Sharpeville. As we shall see in 
the following analysis, Marikana represents a rupture in South African ‘subjects’ who are open to the 
conditions of virtually unchanged Apartheid labour practices in the new South Africa: it is in essence a 
point from which there is no return to the idealistic (but ultimately false) conceptualisation of a non-
racial and equal South Africa.  
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Employing the Theoretical Concepts 
Employing the concepts of dislocation within that of the dominant social order and the process of 
hegemony, which includes and excludes the subject within it, in this case study, as in the other, can lead 
to a reconstitution of the social order (this latter aspect is addressed more thoroughly in the concluding 
chapter). The analysis will proceed through the prism of the events and the position of workers, 
particularly the leadership of the rock drill operators at Marikana throughout the period of the strikes 
and the reactions of the National Union of Mmineworkers (NUM) and AMCU union representation, 
thereby positioning the re-articulations of those dislocated subjects – and their reactions to and within 
the social order – within the larger question of positive radical mobilisations and their consequent 
populist characteristics.  
 
Dislocated Subjects 
Marikana and the Lonmin mine are located in the Rustenburg area, which is part of South Africa’s 
substantial “platinum belt”, a series of mines stretching across from Rustenburg to the Pilanesberg for 
almost 100km in North West Province. Since the end of Apartheid this sector has become an 
increasingly important source of raw material that has richer reserves than gold and has become South 
Africa’s most valuable export92 – a fact driven by the massive increase in the value of platinum since the 
early 1990s and the inevitable drying up of gold deposits.93 The miners, and especially the rock-drill 
operators (RDO), of Marikana have been aware of their substantial role in maintaining this export and 
the riches that come with it94.  At the same time, this work is highly dangerous and risky. Yet the RDOs 
have been remunerated within the traditional framework of migrant labour, with low wages and have 
been classified as unskilled labourers. The strikes were the outcome of a two-fold process in the run up 
to the events of August 2012. Firstly, the miners were aware of their historical position as cheap and 
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replaceable labour, but they had also on many occasions demonstrated their anger and dissatisfaction 
with working conditions by waging strikes in previous years95. Secondly, 2012 had seen rifts forming 
between the major mining trade unions, NUM and AMCU, and the workers.96 
 
As Peter Alexander points out, a crucial aspect of the Lonmin strikes was encapsulated in the unofficial 
nature, by which they were organised, in that they were not officially represented by any union when 
mine workers first withdrew their labour on the 9th of August, 201297. Although the main talking points 
in the weeks and months after the massacre on August 16th revolved to a considerable extent around 
the nature of union politics98 and NUM and AMCU disagreements, the initial strike had been organised 
by an independent strike committee99. While the lack of union leadership in the strike was a unique 
occurrence in South African strike history it is both significant in the scale of the strikes of 2012100 and in 
the deeper endemic representation of what this entails in the processes of the dislocation experienced 
by the Lonmin mine workers and their direct and indirect dependants in both rural and informal 
settlement settings. The main concerns expressed by  miners at Lonmin comprised  a multitude of issues 
that had been plaguing labour and the communities of the local informal settlements in the Marikana 
area for many years prior to the “rupture” in August of 2012, issues that were themselves systemic 
legacies of Apartheid.101 Almost half of labour working in Marikana were relegated – as migrant 
labourers – to informal settlements, with housing built out of corrugated iron sheets, lacking 
connections to electricity, connections to the local water supply, and poor (if any) service delivery.102 
Conditions in the mines did not help alleviate the plight of workers: ‘miners at Marikana… with both 
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opencast and underground operations were… exposed to a variety of safety hazards: falling rocks, 
exposure to dust, intensive noise, fumes and high temperatures, among others.”103  
 
These factors contributed directly to the form of, and function within which, the strikes manifested. As 
an example, much focus has been put on the RDOs at Marikana as being the vanguard of the strike 
action of 2012. Their official classification by the mining companies was as unskilled labour and thus 
their pay structure was relatively low compared to equivalent miners in other parts of the world, where 
the position of rock driller is skilled and includes danger pay.104 Instead, as labourers and migrant labour 
at that, their position was unchanged since the end of Apartheid. They were therefore unable to attain 
the official position of a skilled miner, along with the benefits that would have arisen from such a 
position.105 The RDOs position is thus theoretically that of the heterogeneous subject, or the subject 
(individual) who is always approaching a state of undecidability within the extant social order. RDOs are 
identified by the social order (through the above description on skill-based payments) in a multitude of 
ways: they are essential labour in their function (drilling seams of deposits and preparing them for 
blasting) while similarly being exceptional in their responsibilities (the work is very dangerous and not 
everyone would, or could,  do it), yet they are also held to be unskilled because of their rural origins, age 
(many had functioned in this capacity for 30 years or more106) and replaceability through the large and 
cheap migrant labour pool. Crucially it was not only capital that posited this identification of these 
subjects but the hegemonic social order as encapsulated and enforced by the ANC. This is reflected in 
the economic policies that allowed capital to function and thrive on the systemic artefacts of Apartheid, 
while the NDR holds the subject, i.e. the revolutionary class, in this state perpetually. They (the RDO 
subject) are not whole in the sense of having a static articulation of their own position; they are always 
on the cusp of instability, of losing their positions in the mines and returning to a stagnant existence of 
being poor, illiterate, and jobless. Yet it was this very unstable ‘dislocated subject’ that led the strike. 
Thus it was RDOs who downed their tools and took up the strike action without waiting for the consent 
of a union which might discourage them or outright deny their attempts at expressing grievances and 
seeking change.  
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In this sense, the RDOs sought to re-articulate their position within the social order by self-organising 
the strikes and were joined by (non-RDO) African mine labourers who recognised their own dislocation 
and equivalence with the RDOs. As the strikes progressed they were problematically countered by their 
own representatives in NUM, who “mobilised scabs to break the action”107 at the outset of the strikes 
and further harassed the strikers in the following days. Although the police fired upon them, the Unions, 
and one would include NUM and the white dominated unions, were complicit by their absence. 
Following the massacre on the 16th of August the miners sought to re-articulate themselves and move 
away from their dislocation by seeking alternative ideological representation in the form of AMCU as a 
rejection of and counter to NUM (and its alliances with the social order) despite AMCU positioning itself 
as apolitical. Many had felt betrayed by NUM through its actions during the Marikana strikes108, with 
accusations that suggested that NUM was directly opposed to the interests of the striking miners. 
Although NUM had historically maintained the largest membership of the mine workers, workers almost 
en masse migrated towards AMCU in the months following Marikana as it became the mining union 
power-house in 2013, representing “the three largest gold mines”109 in South Africa.  
 
Conclusions of the Case Study 
Despite the passion of the protests and strikes, the workers, i.e. the subjects, of the South African 
platinum fields have not been able, through their actions, to fill their own undecidability (or position of 
lack within the social order) nor does it seem they will be able to. AMCU, while not being in the position 
of NUM in its relation to COSATU and the ANC – and therefore being (at least not popularly) associated 
with the interests of capital and the current NDR – is, as Alexander points out, open to the “dangers of 
bureaucratisation”. This was one of the complaints of the workers that NUM had ‘sold out’ to capital. 
AMCU finds itself being seduced by the same pressures and therefore having its senior stewards 
included on company pay rolls110 relatively negating the effectiveness of its ability to represent workers 
in the future. If (but most likely when) this occurs and AMCU (as it defines itself as apolitical) becomes 
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just another “betrayer” in the eyes of the miners they will once again be open (although they are 
constantly in this position) to capture by another union or party. This is not to say that this cycle cannot 
be broken, for as the events and results of Marikana have shown, for many miners their historical 
dislocation as miners attached to a system of exploitation and historically abusive practices went 
beyond the realm of change of the prevailing social order promised by the ANC and NDR. Instead, the 
workers became disillusioned and chose to break from it. Many chose to break with the unions and 
opted instead to support the EFF which had successfully launched itself as a political party in the 
background and on the stage of Marikana: partly explained by its emergence within the Left as “…the 
EFF was itself a reflection of a particular restructuring within the Left, despite its many problems and 
limits…” and was welcomed by frustrated workers.111 Although the EFF was unable to insert itself as a 
mediating power, the workers hoped in this attachment that the contestation of the prevailing social 
order would put into practice their own articulated desires for change, which included nationalisation of 
the mines.112 
 
While the Marikana Massacre was widely portrayed as a sudden materialisation of recent grievances, 
this characterisation misses the dissatisfaction of workers with a social order that remained in the 
apartheid mould and hegemonic structures that held them hostage to a future that would never come. 
The portrayal of Marikana as a sudden and unexpected event tends to support a perspective that sees 
the mining industry battling under threat in the context of global capital shifts towards post-industrial 
services. In this sense, workers are framed as reactionary, rather than as a revolutionary force, seeking 
transformation of the system.  Conceptualising the labour strikes as a function of rejecting the “old” 
understandings of systemic racial and economic identifications that were by and large abandoned (at 
least in the sense of being able to fulfil the classical NDR) following the end of Apartheid is one way of 
understanding them. To see the strike and the killings in atavistic terms harking back to ethnic conflict of 
the early 1990s and the hostel killings means that there was no need to interrogate the current 
grievances. Instead, the grievances would have been better treated as a direct function of the mining 
industry’s historical relationship to migrant labour (and its associated systems) under different political, 
economic and social conditions.113 The form of exploitation had not changed significantly. Analysis 
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should have been focused on the impact of government policy towards labour, capital, unions and their 
respective relationships to each other.   
 
When considering Marikana in this manner it comes as no surprise that the shock-value of the event is 
almost ubiquitously evoked as a harkening back to the past of Apartheid violence towards black protests 
and strikes114. However, in the former cases black workers weren’t recognised as employees until 
1979115, whilst today the legal framework that ensures their recognition gives them some standing as 
workers. Yet it also ensures the nature of their exploitation in relation to Capital. To put it simply, the 
critical narratives that highlighted the path being taken towards rupture and explosions of violence in 
the mining industry were well-veiled and far removed from the public eye since 1994, having the effect 
of “no-one seeing it coming”. This lack of recognition of the cleavages and antagonisms, and thus the 
dislocations, in South African labour and its relation to the dominant social order have been shown 
through the events at Marikana to be issues that cannot be solved by traditional liberal (as well as non-
racial) approaches towards redress. The Farlham Commission, set up to investigate the Marikana 
Massacre, has established the criminality of the actions and reactions to the events in the results of the 
tensions but so far, has done little towards answering the causes. Part of the reason is a conceptual and 
theoretical lack in the process itself, for it is only in dealing with the overarching hegemonic power and 
authority of the relationship between the state and capital, and understanding hegemony, dislocation 
and equivalence –that can provide at the very least a pragmatic understanding of why and how things 
happened. It requires a much stronger attempt towards mobilisation of those who are chiefly dislocated 
and bringing their concerns into the public realm through radical action that any change will take place 
(or so we hope to see in the conclusion of this research report). We shall now shift our analysis towards 
a space of contestation which occurred in the wake of Marikana, namely the Western Cape farm 
worker’s strikes of 2012.    
 
Case Study: Western Cape Farm Worker Protests and Strikes 
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Introduction 
Late August of 2012 saw the beginnings of a large farmworker strike in the Western Cape in which 
workers downed tools and refused to return to work if their grievances were not met. The strikes were 
quickly followed by protests in neighbouring townships and farms of the region in the following weeks, 
spreading further and lasting into early 2013, symbolic of workers dissatisfaction with living and working 
conditions throughout the region116. Although relatively overshadowed by the Marikana miner’s strikes 
of mid-August 2012, the Western Cape strikes and protests reflected – in a similar vein – systemic and 
historic legacies that have continued to plague the country since pre-1994 as well as the added historic 
moment of it being the first time in South African history that Western Cape farmworkers rose up in 
anger at their conditions117. Despite this historic moment the farming sector of the Western Cape has 
not been unfamiliar to protest in recent history and should not be seen in the public paradigm (just as 
with Marikana) as a sudden occurrence out of an untroubled background. Service delivery strikes have 
occurred on numerous occasions since in the beginning of the 21st century, with De Doorns itself 
experiencing large service delivery protests in 2003, 2007 and 2011 alongside xenophobic backlashes 
against migrant Zimbabweans in 2009118, a testament to the ever increasing antagonisms that have been 
developing out of South Africa’s largely unresolved past.  
 
The strikes form 
Initially starting on the farms in De Doorns (colloquially known as the “grape capital of South Africa”) on 
the 27th of August 2012 in the wake of Marikana, mostly female farm workers downed their tools 
spontaneously without official sanction and organisation from unions or political parties119. Again, just 
like in Marikana, protests in De Doorns were not confined to the place in which workers laboured but 
also took place in the local informal settlement (Stofland, and later on other settlements in the region) 
in which they and their dependants lived. Grievances were thus not isolated to low pay and working 
conditions (although these were highly problematic and at the forefront from the outset) but also 
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addressed the terrible living conditions of both local and migrant labour – living in corrugated iron 
shacks, with limited access to sanitation, water, and electricity (if any). Isolating the town by cutting off 
roads and the local railway, the workers brought attention to their plight and soon they were being 
joined by strikes in no less that fourteen120 other farming towns in the southern Western Cape all 
predominantly demanding better pay (a meagre daily increase of almost a R100), better living 
conditions, paid maternity leave, the ridding of labour brokerages, and an end to rented homes121. While 
the demands raised varied according to their locations and contained many more concerns than listed 
above, these were overall the main talking points throughout the region in the months of late 2012 and 
early 2013. The strikes were to occur in three phases as they were halted, postponed, and eventually 
dismantled within a political battle between COSATU (and its affiliate FAWU) and BAWUSA: thus the 
original protests and strikes came to an end in mid-November, were taken up again into December, and 
finally made a last push in January of 2013 before stalling. How can we understand the Western Cape 
strikes and protests, and their subsequent dismantling? Perhaps the most useful is to understand 
relationships through the prism of the theoretical concepts dislocation and exclusion of farm workers 
within the dominant social order.   
 
Employing the Theoretical Concepts 
Employing the concept of dislocation within this case study requires the framing of dislocation within 
that of the dominant social order and the process of hegemony which includes and excludes the subject 
within it. The dominant social order within which the farm workers of the Western Cape found and find 
themselves is defined and expressed by ANC policy towards worker and owner relations as well as 
within the larger frame of the NDR and the historic development of the farming sector within South 
Africa’s entrance into a neo-liberal globalised world economy (see the Introduction to the Case Studies). 
We shall now underpin the historic post-Apartheid situation of farm workers in terms of this framework. 
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Dislocation and Hegemony 
Historic Systemic Inequalities: 
Farm labour in South Africa has historically retained a relatively unmechanised nature due to both the 
large presence of labour within the sector (both permanent and migrant) as well as the increased 
commercialisation of farming in order to compete with overseas production markets.122 In the early 
years of the new South Africa, state-controlled marketing boards were dismantled by the ANC 
government and farm owners found themselves in the position of “price takers rather than price 
setters”123, relying on the whims of the international markets in order to acquire a profit and continued 
existence. In the Western Cape this trend was the hardest felt in terms of the nature of produce which 
could be exported and the shift towards a largely citrus and spirits-based agricultural sector was set in 
stone; as they represented on the one hand (in the case of the former), a steady produce which could be 
constantly provided on a seasonal basis – guaranteed by migrant labour – and on the other hand (in the 
case of the latter) provide a commodity that relies on value set by international markets and requires 
the same labour production as the former. As a result this sector has ways been one of South Africa’s 
most labour intensive (alongside mining) and has required over time the solidification of an abundant 
pool of labour in order to meet its production needs. Labour has as a result also had to contend with 
stagnation in wage increases as farm owners continually argued that evolving international standards 
(alongside ever increasing production needs) required cost-cutting.124 
 
This was furthermore exacerbated by the increasing reliance by farm owners on seasonal (African as 
opposed to coloured) labourers from other parts of the country as well as migrant labourers from 
neighbouring countries such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho secured through labour 
brokerages (shown earlier). Wilderman crucially shows that this was a very conscious move on the part 
of farm owners as part of the cost-cutting (and therefore increase in profit) they could acquire by such a 
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shift in labour reliance125. Wages have therefore remained shockingly low, hovering below those of 
domestic workers in a sector that is heavily reliant on manual labour. Furthermore, the increased influx 
of migrant labourers into the Western Cape meant the almost ubiquitous establishment of informal 
settlements and shanty towns surrounding the farm lands. Migrant seasonal labour often displaced 
permanent workers and required housing for themselves and their dependants. Housing had historically 
been negotiable with farm owners on the basis of rent but was now firmly the responsibility of the 
majority of workers, forcing the construction of corrugated shack dwellings with limited service supplies 
throughout the region. 
 
As was stated earlier the strike action in the Western Cape was the first moment in which farm workers 
had openly revolted through ‘overt, confrontational, and adversarial approach*es+’126 in the history of a 
labour sector that had always been fearful of challenging powerful farm owners and had opted for quiet 
mediation through ‘consensual appeals and individual approaches’127 in the resolution of conflicts, 
whether wage disputes, working condition complaints, or general complaints of abuse. In light of the 
above framing of the situation of farm worker’s it is clear that they saw their own position within the 
social order as tenuous at best. Thus farm workers, both permanent and seasonal, are defined by their 
heterogeneity as subjects of the demands of capitalist production as well as the promises of change 
fostered by the language of the NDR. Worker identity is dislocated in a double sense, that they are 
placed in a classic position as exploited workers, with nothing but their labour to sell, and in that sense, 
unable even to reproduce themselves being underpaid, abused, and relegated to poor housing and 
services, while at the same time their role as the revolutionary class in the NDR placed them in the 
position of supporting political and social change that never appeared. The social demands of the 
workers during the strikes therefore addressed concerns which reflected their position of dislocation, 
but which they were unable to alter. These were therefore from the outset not protests but strikes, 
simple and effective downing of tools until their (social) demands were met through either capitulation 
by individual farm owners or bargaining via the government. The hegemonic operation of populism (as 
shown in our analysis of Laclau) had thus begun within this case: at the point where farm workers had 
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drawn a line or antagonistic stances against the social order which enforced their dislocation. However, 
how and where this antagonism is utilised, as positive, negative, or both when dislocation is open to 
interpretation (and interpolation) by ideological narratives and constructs shall be addressed later on.  
 
Equivalence: 
Moving on from hegemony and dislocation we need to address what Laclau referred to as “chain of 
equivalence”. Although we have not specifically singled out (but have mentioned) this notion in our 
theoretical framework it is an important notion in relation to the Western Cape farm worker’s strikes 
and those in Marikana as it helps to explain why solidarity between these two diverse locations and 
their workers was formed (if more often in a one-way manner). Chains of equivalence are the “logical 
next step” in the process of dislocation and the shared consciousness of subjects to their plight as they 
realise their dislocation within the social order (and therefore their antagonism to it). Because of this 
“logical next step” it is easy to assume that equivalence between subjects is determined by an equal 
experience of dislocation. During the strikes and protests of De Doorns, and subsequently other farms 
and areas in the Western Cape, there was a two-fold relation to the experiences of workers in Marikana 
at that same time.128 On the one hand the very fact that these “historic” strikes had occurred so soon 
(barely a week) after those in Marikana resulted in quick referrals to a link between both within the 
media as they struggled to make sense of the upheavals.129 As the strikes and protests increased so too 
did police responses to them, often leading to violent clashes and accusations of police brutality by 
workers and residents on the farm lands and in informal settlements while farm owners and some of the 
media condemned the violent nature of the strikes and protests. This relation was therefore also often 
implied by the media to mean a mimicking of the event s (specifically the massacre of workers by police) 
of Marikana in the Western Cape.130   
 
On the other hand the relation was espoused by many of the farm workers, organising committees and 
unions (official or not) themselves as the strikes drove on in the wake of Marikana. The ideological 
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narratives for the relation were diverse as some referred to the shared experience of violence at the 
hands of police while others claimed their solidarity with those who had also been victims of historic 
oppression. However, there is a quite different sort of chain of equivalence in these different events. 
Equivalential chains in this instance should therefore not be blatantly labelled as symptomatic of direct 
relations between the grievances of Marikana and the Western Cape, that is to say that we should not 
be too quick to immediately forge a link between the two in an emotional appeal of abuses suffered in 
diverse regions as being homogenous. Whilst it could (and should) be argued that the historic and 
systemic artefacts of Apartheid have a very real impact on the state of labour and the “ignored 
members” of South African society (and thus their legacies remain) in the case of the Western Cape 
farm worker organisations, the links to Marikana during the strikes were themselves very consciously 
forged as a political tool. As Wilderman argues: 
 
“…At the outbreak of the strike… the media routinely mentioned Marikana… in conjunction 
with their coverage of the farm protests… *and+ there is some reason to believe that workers 
who mentioned Marikana were reflecting the incident as it had been interpreted and used as 
a tool of mobilisation during the strike, rather than as a deep source of organic [or 
spontaneous+ inspiration.”131 
 
Wilderman goes further in citing Margaret Visser’s study on media coverage of the strikes and protests 
in which she revealed through many interviews with strike participants the concerted effort on the part 
of the organisers to “band together” in light of the Marikana strikes.132 In this respect then equivalence 
between the dislocated subjects in the form of farm workers in the Western Cape and those dislocated 
subjects elsewhere, but especially in Marikana, appears on face-value to have no semblance of 
substance. However, when we consider the theoretical conceptualisation that we are employing in 
regard to our earlier exploration of hegemony, dislocation, and radical democracy, we need remind 
ourselves that dislocated subjects are open to ideological penetration. Equivalence by its very nature 
cannot therefore be relegated to the position of shared identities of dislocation between workers in the 
Western Cape and workers in Marikana. From this then we also must realise that the effort towards 
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identification of positive reconstituted subjectivities within particular struggles in South Africa need not 
rely on homogenous subjectivities per se; or equivalence as equal. In short, the very effort on the part of 
farm workers to organise and mobilise around the loosely shared experiences of Marikana workers at 
that time was itself the reconstitution of subjectivity on their part. While they do not view themselves as 
being dislocated in the same way as those in Gauteng are dislocated, they recognised their shared 
position as those outside the social order and sought to foster within their peers positive action on the 
basis of shared positions of dislocations.   
 
Conclusion of Case Study 
An end to the strikes did not entail real progress for workers in the sense of material gains. Despite the 
increase to R105 day, not all farm owners adopted the new pay scheme while many had dismissed 
workers during the strikes in an effort to curtail the effectiveness of the strikes and (in their view) keep 
production going. Also it should be noted that those workers who were members of the committees 
that formed, shaped, and urged on the strikes were often blacklisted by their employers and other farm 
owners throughout the region, preventing them from returning to work. In the greater political 
battlefield of South Africa, the Western Cape farm worker strikes represented disillusionment with the 
policies of the DA in representing the interests of farm labour while similarly many workers felt betrayed 
by the ANC in its not pursuing the objectives of the NDR. In essence many of the dislocated workers 
were now open to being captured by political representation that rejected both ideological stances of 
the above parties. The alternative presented itself in the form of the EFF and helps to explain the sudden 
interest by COSATU and BAWUSA on the one hand and EFF concerns on the other with the farmworker 
strikes during their final months.  
 
Shawn Hattingh highlights an important point in a citation of the Human Rights Watch study on the 
Agrarian sector in the Western Cape. He shows that that union representation in the farming sector of 
South Africa has historically been limited, with ‘only about three percent of workers being officially 
represented’.133 In light of this it is curious that COSATU and BAWUSA intervened in the strikes so 
                                                          
133 Pointer, R. ‘Foreclosing New Identities’, pg. 6 
- 57 - 
 
vigorously towards the end of 2012. The interventions were not only instrumental in the initial 
dismantling of the strikes, but sowed divisions and caused conflict not only between the two union 
groupings, but also between the unions and workers, and between the workers themselves. In 
theoretical terms, the argument is that the workers, the dislocated subjects, were caught in an 
ideological struggle over hegemony, where different forms of representative political authority were 
struggling to capture them for their own political ends. Farm Workers themselves expressed concerns 
about the blanket disregard of political parties for radical change within their sector: they concluded 
that not only the DA, but also the ANC were on the side of capital, having “shares in the farms”. At the 
same time, they were not captured wholesale by the EFF whom they saw only as representing their 
concerns to a degree. The outcome was that many sided with the newly formed United Front 
(supported by NUMSA) and their anti-capitalist manifesto. It is in these formulations around the 
capturing of the “open dislocated subjects” of the Western Cape that we are faced with the difficult 
question of how meaningful and radical change can be produced.  
 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
A Re-Cap 
To recap, the research report firstly defined and (in Chapter 1) stipulated the main “problem” associated 
with the conceptualisation of populism, specifically in relation to the vagueness associated with it, and 
the uncertainty relegated to its position within the political, both globally and locally. We chose to 
address this vagueness by showing in the “purpose” the theoretical approach we chose towards 
reconstituting the nature and functioning of populism: namely the work of Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj 
Zizek.  Chapter 1 defined and demonstrated the method through which we sought to address the 
uncertainty around the populist political challenge by stipulating an empirical framework consisting of 
two case studies. Having defined the scope of the research report in Chapter 1, Chapter 2, or the 
Literature Review, thus concerned itself with exploring the dominant literature which approached 
populism from a normative and positive stance and defined the choice of conceptual and theoretical 
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notions to construct a working framework for our analysis. Having done so, and selecting Laclau’s 
notions of hegemony, radical democracy, populism and Zizek’s concept of antagonism, Chapter 3, or the 
South African Literature Review, explored key texts in the local (recent, or, post-Apartheid) literature on 
the topic of populism in order to bring the theory “home”, thereby grounding our theoretical stance 
within the specific local sights of hegemonic, radically democratic, populist, and antagonistic struggles. 
The local literature we looked at was comprised of Gillian Hart, Ralph Mathegka, C.R.D. Halisi, and 
Sabelo J. Ndlovo-Gatsheni.  
 
Having sufficiently (as much as a research report allows for) placed the theory within the context of 
South African particularities, Chapter 4, or the Case Studies, concerned itself with an analysis of the 
Marikana miner’s strikes and massacre by police of 2012, and the Western Cape farm worker’s strikes of 
the same year, continuing into 2013. This effort sought to explain, by looking at the specific concerns 
and evolutionary movement of the events, instances of subject dislocations within the established social 
order of hegemonic ANC rule and neo-liberal economic policies in South Africa. The dislocations were 
analysed further in their equivalency with other dislocations, which helped to explain the spreading and 
momentum in popular shifts within the strikes themselves. In this manner a link was constructed 
(although critically examined) between the particular spaces of struggle (Marikana and the Western 
Cape) on the level of the universal. Finally we now arrive at the point in which we may take the analysis 
and argument further by addressing the overall conclusion of this research report: namely, what the role 
of populism is within South Africa and what possibilities it holds for the political.  
 
A part of what we are witnessing in the manner in which alliances have been splitting post-Marikana is 
arguably a re-opening and re-interpretation of the ideological battlefields that prominently existed pre-
1994/6. These voices are becoming more influential and although never entirely silenced, have for the 
last two decades largely remained hushed within the official political spaces of parties, unions, and 
socio-political movements and the larger Left in general. The question for South African contemporary 
(and future) politics is then ‘How do we mobilise re-articulations of the Left in ways that are radically 
pragmatic yet positive?’ The research report has made an attempt at providing an analysis that can 
hopefully provide an inroad into understanding and framing the possible answers towards this question. 
Radical democracy (and its programmes of action) should be understood within the realm of the 
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political subject and his/her dislocation within the bounds of the extant liberal democratic, but crucially 
non-racial, hegemonic social order that is dominated by the ANC, Capital, and the language of the NDR. 
Populism is thusly not a mode of political mobilisation or action, but rather the mode of the constitution 
of those who fall outside the bounds of democracy (as represented by this dominant order) – its 
interpolation of its own subjects as deficient in democratic terms (or lacking fullness). When these 
subjects recognise their lack, or when workers in South Africa strike without official (union) 
representation, and band with others who share their position they enable the populist expression to 
recognise the limits of the social order in addressing (filling) their emptiness. This moment itself, the 
recognition of the lack in democracy, begins the radical democratic project towards addressing (filling) 
it, but the substance (ideological narrative) that fills the vacuum can be altered at any given moment. 
Therefore, South Africa’s current moment in the Left as related to the dominant ANC position, is well-
explained by Mazibuko Jara who pertinently expresses the point 
 
“…but so far there has not been a real break within the ruling elite… and the only place where 
you can see a break is in the form of the [Marikana] mineworkers and the motives of the 
EFF… as having begun to challenge the ANC and the hegemony of the ruling elite... but the 
ANC is still popular, even amongst the sections of society which has shown its unhappiness… 
[and furthermore] when it comes to the situation of the Left it is not yet in a position where it 
can fully restructure itself and shape politics in a more direct and systematic way [than it 
currently is(n’t)+”134 
 
In conclusion, populism has been shown within the scope of the research report to function as a useful 
conceptual and theoretical tool in understanding political developments and popular movement 
mobilisations in the contemporary South African scene. It is further quite useful in using the resulting 
understandings (when utilised as described) as a gauge for democratic society and the interpolations of 
democratic subjects within it – their participation and identification with democracy and finally as an 
understanding of the manner in which the social whole conceives of the subject’s identity. Future 
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research on South Africa’s complex political, social, and economic history (and current situation) could 
benefit from more in-depth analysis of this interesting and relevant entity known as Populism.  
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